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Past and Future Work at the International Labour Organization:  









This article analyses past and future work at the International Labour Organization (ILO) with 
reference to the transformational analysis offered by Karl Polanyi, examining how constitutional 
statements made through ILO Declarations reflect countermovement to market dominance. These 
policy shifts at the ILO are also analysed in relation to the three pillars of sustainability 
(environmental, economic and social), which arguably map onto Polanyi’s three fictitious 
commodities (with a focus on labour as emblematic of social concerns). It is argued that the 
emphasis on social justice and sustainability in the 2019 ILO Global Commission Report, 
including the proposal for a Universal Labour Guarantee, provides significant resistance to the 
economic orthodoxy regarding the future of work promoted by the World Bank Group and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, this narrative of 
ILO countermovement also exposes a lack of balanced regulation which requires more inclusive 
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1. Introduction   
 
As we consider new roles for private and public authority governing labour standards in this 
special issue, it is also timely to reflect on the more established International Labour 
Organization (ILO), which has been seeking a recipe for effective governance since 1919. At the 
date of its creation, the ILO offered a unique experimental form of tripartite participation, which 
tempered state control of its activities. In this way, voice was given to the representatives of 
management and labour on the international stage in unprecedented ways, leading to the 
innovative adoption of international labour standards both recommendatory and formally binding 
under international law.1 Yet, at the same time, finding appropriate enforcement mechanisms for 
the standards the ILO sought to create was far from straightforward. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ), initially envisaged by the ILO Constitution as a source of recourse,2 
was too powerful and stringent a source of authority to be let loose on what was to be a 
collaborative governance process. Instead, experimentation with suitable tripartite and expert 
supervisory procedures led to the complex matrix of operations at play in the ILO today.3 These 
internal dynamics of the ILO (and, its secretariat, the International Labour Office) also have to 
be juxtaposed with its external influence.4 The ILO’s journey over the past century will be 
traversed below, alongside the attempt to look forward to a new future (or ‘futures’) of work.5  
 
1 Albert Thomas, ‘The International Labour Organization: Its Origins, Development and Future’ (1921) 1 
International Labour Review 5; for comment, see Tonia Novitz and Phil Syrpis, ‘Assessing Legitimate Structures 
for the Making of Transnational Labour Law: The Durability of Corporatism’ (2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 367. 
2 See ILO Constitution, Article 29, utilised only in a series of references to the PCIJ between 1922 and 1926. 
3 Anne Trebilcock, ‘The International Labour Organization’ in Michael Bowman and Dino Kritsiotis (eds), 
Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties (Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
4 Huw Thomas and Peter Turnbull, ‘From Horizontal to Vertical Labour Governance: The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and Decent Work in Global Supply Chains’ (2018) 71(4) Human Relations 536. 
5 Cf. Katie Bales, Harry Pitts and Huw Thomas, ‘Editorial: From the Future of Work to Futures of Work’ (Web 






This article puts forward the argument that the ILO’s future role need not be viewed in terms of a 
dramatic break with the past, but rather in Polanyian terms as the continued attempt to navigate 
(and reconcile insofar as this is ever possible) conflicting market and social pressures.6 It is 
argued that the ILO still has an important role to play as a navigator, but that the rapidity of 
attempts to achieve constitutional change in recent years, alongside the emergence of other 
countermovements, whether those associated with populism or sustainability, are indicative of an 
economic system which is failing the complex global society in which it should be embedded. 
 
The next part of this article examines a Polanyian theoretical frame as a starting point for 
understanding regulation of labour markets.7 The third part argues that the treatment by Polanyi 
of countermovement is helpful in understanding attempts by the ILO to resist market pressures at 
various junctures and offer constitutional (albeit declaratory) solutions embedded in an idea of 
‘social justice’. The fourth part considers how Polanyi’s account of the fictitious commodities of 
‘land’, ‘labour’ and ‘money’8 may be mapped onto contemporary concerns with ‘three pillars’ of 
sustainability: ‘environmental’, ‘social’ and ‘economic’.9 The final part examines the ILO Global 
Commission Report published on 22 January 2019,10 which provided a basis for the Centennial 
Declaration adopted on 26 June 2019, alongside the Report of the International Labour Office on 
 
6 The primary source being Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our 
Time (Beacon Press, 2001, 2nd paperback ed).   
7 For eg see Ronaldo Munck, ‘Globalization, Labor and the “Polanyi” Problem’ (2004) 45(3) Labor History 252; 
Judy Fudge, ‘The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights’ (2007) 29 Comparative 
Labor Law and Policy Journal  29; Guy Standing, ‘The International Labour Organization’ (2010) 15(2) New 
Political Economy 307. 
8 Ibid., chapter 6. 
9 Building on observations made by Thomas Wanner, ‘The New “Passive Revolution“ of the Green Economy and 
Growth Discourse: Maintaining the “Sustainable Development“ of Neoliberal Capitalism‘ (2015) 20(1) New 
Political Economy 21; and Fikret Adaman, Pat Devine, and Begum Ozkaynak, ‘Reinstituting the Economic Process: 
(Re)embedding the economy in society and nature‘ (2003) 13(2) International Review of Sociology/Revue 
Internationale de Sociologie 357. 
10 International Labour Organization (ILO) Global Commission on the Future of Work, Work for a brighter future 
(ILO, 2019), Report issued 22 January, 2019 (online report, 18 June 2019) 





Time to Act for SDG 8: Integrating Decent Work, Sustained Growth and Environmental Integrity 
issued on 10 July 2019.11 These developments can be distinguished from (and may act as a 
corrective to) reports on the future of work also issued in this ILO centenary year by other 
international institutions, namely the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)12 and the World Bank Group,13 which focus on economic objectives. The article 
concludes by contending that it remains important for the ILO to articulate sustainable 
alternatives to a dominant market-led perspective on the future of work. Yet, the ILO’s recent 
history, punctuated by constitutional instruments which reflect repeated resistance to economic 
injustice and societal destruction, also exposes the failure of global economic governance to 
promote and engage representative and participatory voice. 
 
2. Polanyi’s Identification of ‘Fictitious Commodities’ and ‘Countermovement’ 
 
Polanyi’s book, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
first published in 1944 was, as its subtitle indicates, very much concerned with a specific 
historical period.14  Yet, his work has contemporary relevance as we seek to understand the 
contemporary relationship between ‘productive forces’ and human politics. His writing remains a 
recurrent reference point.15 
 
11 ILO International Labour Office, Time to act for SDG 8: Integrating decent work, sustained growth and 
environmental integrity (ILO, 2019), Report issued 10 July 2019 (online report, 2 August 2019) 
<https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/WCMS_712685/lang--en/index.htm>.  
12 OECD, Policy Responses to New Forms of Work (OECD Publishing, 2019), Report issued 21 March 2019 (online 
report, 24 April 2019) <http://www.oecd.org/els/policy-responses-to-new-forms-of-work-0763f1b7-en.htm>.  
13 World Bank, World Development Report 2019: The Changing Nature of Work (World Bank, 2019) (online report, 
24 April 2019) <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30435>.  
14 For some of this history, see Fred Block, ‘Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation’ (2003) 32 
Theory and Society 275; also Fred Block and Margaret Somers, The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl 
Polanyi’s Critique (Harvard University Press, 2014). Note also Polanyi’s other writings, including ‘The Economy as 
Instituted Process’ in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Sociology of Economic Life, 3rd ed. 
(Routledge, 2018). 
15 See for eg in relation to the  European Union (EU), Diamond Ashiagbor, ‘Unravelling the Embedded Liberal 






Polanyi was concerned with what he described as ‘fictitious commodities’: land, labour and 
money. 16 These are not ‘produced for sale’ like other commodities. Land (or nature) exists 
independently of human commerce and cannot be completely tamed; labour is a human activity 
which cannot neatly be detached from the rest of life or be ‘stored’; while money is a mere 
‘token’ or representation of purchasing power created by banking or state finance.17 These 
features make them inappropriate subjects for exposure to fluctuating market value: ‘To allow 
the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the 
demolition of society.’18  
 
While others claimed that the market could self-correct in response to such a threat,19 Polanyi 
considered that assumption flawed.20 Instead, markets need regulation through a political 
process, or re-embedding in our complex society. Every period of market building or ‘economic 
reconstruction’ would according to Polanyi’s analysis induce a countermovement which would 
offer new systems of social protection compatible with the changes:21 “human society would 
have been annihilated but for protective counter-moves which blunted the action of this self-
destructive mechanism”.22 Indeed, this could be understood as a form of “double movement”, 
such that “the extension of market organization in respect to genuine commodities was 
accompanied by its restriction in respect of fictitious ones”.23 However, The Great 
 
Journal 303; and Richard Hyman, ‘Three Scenarios for Industrial Relations in Europe’ (2015) 154(1) International 
Labour Review 5. 
16 Block (n 14), 281. 
17 Polanyi (n 6), 75. 
18 Ibid., 76. 
19 See Friedrich A. Von Hayek, ‘Economics and Knowledge’ (1937) 4(13) Economica 33; and Frederich A. Hayek, 
The Road to Serfdom (Dymock’s, 1944) discussed in Damien Cahill, ‘Polanyi, Hayek and Embedded Neoliberalism’ 
(2018) 15(7) Globalizations 977,  985 - 991.  
20 Ibid., 3. 
21 Summarised by Fudge (n 7), 32 - 33. 






Transformation was vague as to the form such countermovement might take. Polanyi referred to 
“a network of measures and policies… integrated into powerful institutions designed to check 
the action of the market relative to land, labor and money”.24 The protective countermovement 
instantiated in law and regulation can also be seen as a reflection of societal voice stemming 
from a wide range of groups in society.25 
 
There remain contradictions in Polanyi’s approach,26 not least because state action which he 
viewed as a potential restriction on markets can also be co-opted for market-led purposes. In this, 
he himself cited the design of the British ‘Speenhamland’ wage subsidies (linked to the price of 
bread) that were aimed at providing a “right to live”,27 but which ultimately acted as a 
disincentive for achieving meaningful independent employment. When this species of the ‘poor 
laws’ was abolished, an already vulnerable workforce, having been subjected to “degradation” 
and “pauperization”, was easily manipulated and commodified for nineteenth century industrial 
production.28  
 
A further uncertainty in Polanyi’s writing is what we are to understand by ‘disembeddedness’,29 
for it is not possible for a market to exist without some form of state support.30 Rather, there may 
be different ways (and degrees) of embeddedness, which can be mapped onto the identification 
of distinct varieties of capitalism operating at national, regional and international levels.31 There 
is also a perhaps even more interesting question of what is the ‘society’ that the economy is to be 
 
24 Ibid.  
25 Fred Block, ‘Introduction’ to Polanyi (n 6), xviii. 
26 Block (n 14), 289 – 294. 
27 Polanyi (n 6), 82 and 85. 
28 Ibid., 86 – 87; also chapters 8 and 9 See further the historical analysis offered by Simon Deakin and Frank 
Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution (Oxford University 
Press, 2005), chapter 3. 
29 Block (n 14), 294  - 295; Block and Summers (n 14), 73 – 4. 
30 Bernard Barber, ‘All Economies are “Embedded”: The Career of a Concept and Beyond’ (1995) 62(2) Social 
Research 387; and Cahill (n 19), 980 who notes that this point is made emphatically in Polanyi (n 14), 250. 
31 Ashiagbor (n 15), 306 citing Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 





emebedded within. Is this to be understood as society operating a domestic, regional or even 
global level? And who is to be represented through societal voice?32  
 
As Nancy Fraser has pointed out, Polanyi seems to idealise society in an almost communitarian 
fashion, which can itself be a source of injustice.33 The answer to this objection may lie in 
Polanyi’s appreciation that, as the market becomes more disembedded from society, we can 
expect protest that entails rejection of market forces, but also more dynamic challenges to forms 
of injustice as they become recognised. We might understand countermovement now, in an era 
of complex global commodity and supply chains, in terms of “multiple public and private actors” 
interacting in a variety of ways.34 Fraser suggests that it should be possible for actors to 
“integrate social protection with emancipation”.35 Contemporary examples may include demands 
for corporate social responsibility and emergent green movements which lead to regulatory 
changes among private and public actors.36  
 
Polanyi further conceded that the process of ‘double movement’ (pressure for market expansion, 
alongside societal resistance requiring some market contraction) can have negative effects. For 
example, it can lead to limitations being placed on even beneficial market operations in extreme 
and unexpected ways. Polanyi gave the example of rising tariff barriers in response to national 
protectionist interests, which are disadvantageous for everyone in terms of the higher costs of 
 
32 Diamond Ashiagbor, Prabha Kotiswaran, Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘Introduction: Moving towards an Economic 
Sociology of Law’ (2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 1.  
33 Nancy Fraser, ‘Can Society be Commodities All the Way Down? Post-Polanyian reflections on capitalist crisis’ 
(2014) 43(4) Economy and Society 541, 544. 
34 See Ernst Langthaler and Elke Schüßler, ‘Commodity Studies with Polanyi: Disembedding and Re-Embedding 
Labour and Land in Contemporary Capitalism’ (2009) 44(2) Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 209, 213. See 
Janelle Diller (this volume). 
35 Fraser (n 33), 554. 
36 Lilian Moncrieff, ‘Karl Polanyi and the Problem of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2015) 42(3) Journal of Law 
and Society 434, 446 – 450; Ronaldo Munck, Globalization and Contestation: The New Great Counter-Movement 
(Routledge, 2006); and Diana Stuart, Ryan Gunderson, and Brian Petersen, ’Climate Change and the Polanyian 





goods.37 He was also aware “of reactionary forces striving for a re-embedding of markets, 
fascism framed as ‘national socialism’ being a prime example of the latter”.38 Contemporary 
populism and authoritarian government may be understood as one such problematic 
manifestation of this process.39 
 
So, while countermovement is valuable as a corrective, it would be better to avoid the extremity 
of such responses through more consistent democratic and egalitarian forms of ongoing 
institutional governance of markets.40 Polanyi advocated that, in a complex society, we accept 
some regulatory constraints in order to achieve “more abundant freedom for all”, which cannot 
be realized by a mere market structure concerned only with profits.41 Separation of politics and 
economics was seen by Polanyi as dangerous.42 Instead, he sought a system of “integration in 
society” which also entailed greater rights (or freedom) for the individual.43 He even provided an 
early vision of regulation occurring not only through states, but by states acting within 
international organizations.44  
 
3. Countermovement in the ILO over the Past Century  
 
Polanyi welcomed creation of a League of Nations, although he was concerned by the 
relationship established by the Treaty of Versailles between the victor and vanquished states and 
 
37 Block (n 14), 296 – 8. 
38 Langthaler and Schüßler (n 34), 214. 
39 Alan Bogg and Mark Freedland, ‘Labour Law in the Age of Populism: Towards Sustainable Democratic 
Engagement’ in Julia Lopez Lopez (ed), Collective Bargaining and Collective Action: Labour Agency and 
Governance in the 21st Century? (Hart, 2018). Tonia Novitz, ‘Freedom of Association: Its emergence and the case 
for prevention of its decline’ in Janice Bellace and Beryl Ter Haar (eds), Business, Labour and Human Rights 
(Edward Elgar, 2019). 
40 Block (n 14), 300-301. 
41 Polanyi (n 6), 268. 
42 Ibid., 263.  
43 Ibid., 264. 
44 Gareth Dale, ‘In Search of Karl Polanyi’s International Relations Theory’ (2016) 42 Review of International 





he foresaw problems with the focus on “Peace through Gold”.45 By 1944, his hope was that a 
new ‘international economic order’ would emerge.46 In 1982, John Ruggie coined the term 
‘embedded liberalism’ to reflect the compromise that was reached after the Second World War 
between domestic sovereign economy and multilateral institutions, which entailed “a 
combination of global currency regulations and domestic commitments to welfare capitalism”.47 
More recently, it has been suggested that this compromise has (following a variety of reforms to 
international institutions) embedded ‘neo-liberalism’, whereby transnational global markets have 
been able to prevail over domestic assertion of social values.48 This section of the article charts 
the ILO’s roles in promoting and resisting these developments, with reference to four key 
constitutional instruments adopted by the ILO. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles established the 
initial objectives and governance structure of the ILO, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia 
encapsulated the Organization’s human rights credentials and preoccupation with freedom of 
association,49 the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work instantiated 
Director-General Michel Hansenne’s determination to focus on ‘core labour standards’,50 and the 
2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization was intended to give effect to 
 
45 Ibid, referring at 404 – 405 and 413 to Polanyi’s original writings in translation from 1924 – 1937. See also 
Polanyi (n 6), chapters 16, 17 and 18; discussed by Dale (n 44) at 416-17 and 420. 
46 Dale (n 44), 407 (again citing an unpublished paper on ‘The Theory of Politics’). 
47 Cahill (n 19), 978 and Dale (n 44), 402. Both citing John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and 
Change: Embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order’ (1982) 36(2) International Organization 385.  
48 Cf. Joo-Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing, ‘Labour Provisions in Trade Agreements: Neoliberal regulation at 
work?’ (this issue); Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, ‘Transnationalization and the Restructuring of Europe’s 
Socioeconomic Order‘ (1998) 28(1) International Journal of Political Economy 12; Philip G. Cerny, ‘Embedding 
Neoliberalism: The evolution of a hegemonic paradigm‘ (2008) 2(1) The Journal of International Trade and 
Diplomacy 1; Cahill (n 19) and also Damien Cahill, The End of Laissez-Faire? On the Durability of Embedded 
Neoliberalism (Edward Elgar, 2014). 
49 J. D. French, ‘The Declaration of Philadelphia and the Global Social Charter of the United Nations 1944- 45’ in 
Werner Sengenberger and Duncan Campbell (eds), International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence 
(ILO, 1996). 
50 Janice Bellace, ‘The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (2001) 17 International 





Director-General Juan Somavia’s “Decent Work Agenda”.51 The aim is to assess the extent to 
which each can be understood as a manifestation of a countermovement challenging market 
dominance. Before proceeding, it may be helpful at the outset to outline two prominent opposing 
views on the evolution of ILO governance and regulation.  
 
Guy Standing has asserted that “[t ]he story of the ILO can be told in four acts, or periods: 1919-
44, 1944-69, 1970-98 and 1999-2009”. His view is that the first two map onto Polanyi’s “Great 
Transformation”, that is, “establishment of a regulated national market society based mainly on 
industrial labour”; while the latter two periods witnessed its collapse and the “painful forging of 
a global market society”.52 In so doing, Standing has alleged that the International Labour Office 
has gone from a “professional secretariat” to a “populist gadfly”, succumbing to external 
pressures and losing relevance.53 From a Polanyian perspective, Standing considers that the ILO 
has become normatively ‘disembedded’, offering no meaningful constraint on the practices of 
international economic institutions.54 Standing is not alone in seeing international institutions as 
privileging flexible markets at the expense of people and of their environment.55 However, he 
stands out by pointing to the ILO, and what he sees as its failures, as a contributing cause. 
 
The other ongoing staunch critic of the ILO, Brian Langille, does not use a Polanyian analysis, 
but argues (in stark opposition to Standing) that the Organization is now trying to do too much to 
control the conduct of its member states, following an outdated “Geneva consensus” when it 
should be more sensitive to the needs of developing countries, facilitating rather than obstructing 
markets.56 Langille has charted ILO history with reference to ‘key’ and ‘significant’ moments, 
 
51 Francis Maupain, ‘New Foundation or New Façade? The ILO and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a 
Fair Globalization’ (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law 823. 
52 Standing (n 8), 307. 
53 Guy Standing, ‘The ILO: An Agency for Globalization’ (2008) 39(3) Development and Change 355, 374 – 378. 
54 Ibid., at 361-365. 
55 See Van Apeldoorn (n 48) and Cahill (n 19) above. 
56 Brian Langille, ‘“Hard Law Makes Bad Cases”: The International Labour Organization (Nervously) Confronts 
New Governance Institutions’ (2016) 32(4) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 407; and Brian Langille, ‘Imagining Post Geneva Consensus Labor Law for Post Washington Consensus 





such as the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.57 Taking the liberty 
of reconstructing Langille’s arguments along Polanyian lines, he contends essentially that the 
ILO is currently overly concerned with ‘embedding’ the market in the social. Its international 
labour standards are unduly coercive, providing unwarranted constraints on market activities, 
when its concern should lie with building (his conception of) capabilities of workers.58 It should 
be added that Langille’s conception of capabilities as primarily concerned with individual 
freedoms has been widely contested by scholars who draw on the work of Polanyi and Amartya 
Sen.59 In particular, Deakin and Wilkinson have argued that it may be more important to provide 
scope for the collective realization of capabilities through both devotion of targeted state 
resources and procedural means such as collective bargaining and corporate governance.60 
 
There is an alternative view of ILO activities which lies somewhere between the perspectives 
offered by Standing and Langille. This involves recognition of the ILO as an international 
institution trying to navigate longstanding tensions between the market and the social in ways 
that never have or will be wholly reconciled. The ILO lacks the economic power of the Bretton 
Woods institutions; it does not possess the weapon of financial conditionality manifested 
notoriously through the Washington Consensus and more recently in austerity policies following 
the global financial crisis.61 Despite Langille’s allegations that the ILO has overreached its 
constitutional capacities, it has only been able in a soft sense to name and shame constituent 
member states and only then to the extent that its tripartite constitution of norm-making and 
 
57 Brian Langille, ‘Core Labour Standards – The True Story (Reply to Alston)’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 409, at 410 and 420 respectively. 
58 Ibid., and Langille (ed), The Capability Approach to Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2019).   
59 See Fudge (n 7), 58 – 63; and Pascal McDongall, ‘Keynes, Sen and Hayek: Competing Approaches to 
International Labor Law in the ILO and the WTO, 1994 – 2008’ (2017) 15 Nw U.J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 32, 66-70. 
60 Deakin and Wilkinson (n 28), 351-2. 
61 See concern expressed by the UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other financial obligations 
of States, see the reports issued in 2017 available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/34/57 





supervisory bodies will allow.62 Harry Arthurs has notably described the institution as an 
“archetypal discursive community”, which promotes discussion in a tripartite assembly, granting 
audience also to key transnational actors and non-governmental organizations”.63 It is with a 
sense of these limitations in mind, imposed at the outset, that we may best understand the ILO as 
a regulatory navigator in the international economic order. 
 
3.1 The Original ILO Constitution of 1919 
 
Polanyi contemplated that the ILO, as an international regulator of labour standards, would take 
its place in the new international economic order alongside the Bretton Woods institutions, 
namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and of course within the 
broader framework of the United Nations (UN).64 Indeed, he referred to the International Labour 
Office (the ILO’s Secretariat) in The Great Transformation as having been created “in order to 
equalize conditions of competition between states”.65 Of course, from a Polanyian perspective, 
the ILO had been created to do more than this.  
 
The ILO was not merely concerned with setting terms of trade which applied equally to 
everyone. That ambition was to be reflected in the Most Favoured Nation principle embedded in 
Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provisionally adopted in 1948 
and still in force as amended after creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ILO’s 
aim was to set fair terms of competition. The rallying cry in the Preamble to the first Constitution 
of the ILO (to be found in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles) was “social justice”. The first 
general principle in Section II (Article 427) was that “labour should not be regarded merely as a 
commodity or article of commerce”, an idea on which Polanyi drew himself decades later.  
 
62 Janice Bellace, ‘The ILO and Tripartism: The Challenge of Balancing the Three-Legged Stool’, paper presented at 
ILO Law for Social Justice conference, Geneva, 16 April 2019; forthcoming in George Politakis (ed), Law for 
Social Justice (ILO, 2019). 
63 Harry Arthurs, ‘Extraterritoriality by Other Means: How Labor Law Sneaks Across Borders, Conquers Minds, 
and Controls Workplaces Abroad’ (2010) 21 Stanford Law and Policy Review 527 at 539. 
64 Dale (n 44), 420 - 422. 






The tripartite structure of the ILO66 was an important innovation, which enabled connection with 
both the social concerns of organised labour and the commercial interests of employers; this was 
both an enabling device but also a constraint requiring compromise.67 Representation of worker 
and employer interests in a collective form within the ILO could be achieved by the 
constitutional protection of ‘the right of freedom of association’. This was also a way to ensure 
reference to socially embedded understandings of what was acceptable behavior in the context of 
labour markets.68 
 
3.2 Revitalisation after the Second World War through the Declaration of Philadelphia 
1944 
 
The 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia precipitated the end of the Second World War by 
incorporating a human rights competence into the ILO; reflecting reactions to the labour abuses 
experienced during wartime.69 Notably, Article I reiterated that: 
(a) labour is not a commodity;  
(b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress;  
(c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere… 
The right of collective bargaining and for workers and employers to be given voice “in the 
preparation and application of social and economic measures” was recognised in Article III(e). 
Also impressive was a statement in Article II (c) of the Declaration to the effect that economic 
and financial policies, whether national or international, should be accepted “only insofar as they 
may be held to promote and not to hinder” the achievement of the Organization’s fundamental 
objective, namely ‘social justice’. This was arguably Polanyian ‘embedding’ par excellence, 
 
66 Established by the Treaty of Versailles, Articles 389 – 391 (relating to the International Labour Conference) and 
Article 393 (regarding the constitution of the Governing Body). 
67 See today’s ILO Constitution, Articles 3, 4 and 7 (Web Page, 28 April 2019) 
<https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO>.  
68 Harold Butler, The International Labour Organization (Oxford University Press, 1939), 7-8. 






although tussles remained (and continue) regarding the interpretation of the idea of ‘social 
justice’ when manifested in concrete ILO Conventions, the supervision of constitutional and 
Convention standards, and their implementation through subsequent technical assistance and 
other programmes.  
 
What was left out of the post-1944 ILO constitutional equation, and arguably never adequately 
addressed, were the extreme differentials in wealth and thereby the balance of power between 
states. There was an obvious divide between the so-called ‘developed states’, consisting of the 
previous colonial and industrial powers in what has been termed the ‘Global North’, and the 
decolonized ‘developing states’ of the ‘Global South’.70 Before the United States (US) joined the 
ILO in 1934, the concern was that: “Above all else, the International Labour Organization must 
justify itself to the European organised industrialised democracies.”71 Fraser has observed that: 
“What Polanyi did not anticipate was that the ‘embedded liberalism’ established after the War 
would serve some states much better than others.”72 Responding to entrenched disadvantage and 
injustice, the Group of 77 became a dominant force within the ILO, leading to more overt 
engagement in global politics; but the United States then rebelled, withdrawing with 
considerable budgetary costs (both short and long term) from 1977 – 1980.73  
 
3.3 Protection of ‘Core Labour Standards’ in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work 
 
During the Cold War, the ILO had an important role to play as a bridge between East and West, 
so the US was always likely to return to the fold. From 1994 onwards, when capitalism emerged 
 
70 Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Harvard UP, 2016); Miriam 
Ronzoni, ‘Global Labour Injustice: A Critical Overview’ in Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner and Faina Milman-Sivan 
(eds), Global Justice and International Labour Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
71 George Barnes, History of the International Labour Office (Williams and Norgate, 1926), 79. 
72 Fraser (n 33), 553. 
73 Victor-Yves Ghebali, The International Labour Organization: A case study on the evolution of UN specialised 
agencies (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 41-2 and 110 – 116; Stephen L. Schlossberg, ‘United States 





victorious, the ILO had to work harder to convince the international community of its 
significance.74 The ILO accordingly devised a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work 1998 designed to appeal to all constituent members. Article 2 set out four ‘core labour 
standards’ to which all States were obliged to describe by virtue of their prior obligations under 
the extant ILO Constitution (as supplemented by the Declaration of Philadelphia which had been 
appended to the original text of the Treaty of Versailles). These consisted of: 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
 
The Declaration was built on the ILO Governing Body campaign of 1995 to ratify certain select 
‘core’ Conventions: Convention Nos. 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (1948 and 1949); Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 on the elimination of all forms of 
forced and compulsory labour (1930 and 1957); ILO Convention No. 138 on the minimum age 
for admission to employment (1973); and ILO Conventions Nos. 100 and 111 on the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (1957 and 1958).  In 1999, an eighth 
‘core’ Convention was adopted, the 1999 ILO Convention No. 182 on the worst forms of child 
labour, which supplemented the pre-existing ILO Programme for the Elimination of Child 
Labour (IPEC).  
 
The Declaration did not merely ‘recognise’ these existing constitutional rights and principles, but 
also set out a ‘follow-up’ procedure. This consisted of annual review of the extent to which 
Member States who had not ratified ‘core’ ILO Conventions could be said to comply with the 
core labour standards (ratifying states being covered by existing supervisory machinery) and a 
global report on each of the core labour standards every four years, which exposed non-
compliance by developed as well as developing states.75 
 
74 Discussed in Tonia Novitz, International Protection of the Right to Strike (Oxford University Press, 2003), 
chapter 5. 






The list of entitlements in Article 2 of the 1998 Declaration fell short of those listed in the 
Preamble or General Principles section II of Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles; nor did they 
even reflect all those set out in the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration. Where was health and safety, 
or even freedom of expression?76 Langille stated that he saw no harm in this reduced ambit for 
ILO activities, which protected process rights rather than substantive outcomes and so were more 
achievable for developing countries, and the building of capabilities therein.77 Notably, this 
selection of standards had also been endorsed by OECD studies as compatible with the trade 
aspirations of developing countries.78 Others however saw this change as an unwarranted and 
unprecedented limitation of ILO competence, reducing this merely to promotion of civil and 
political rights (and even just a selection of these), while moving away from insistence on 
broader socio-economic entitlements and compliance with the actual text of ILO Conventions.79 
Philip Alston expressed concern that the core labour standards would reflect “those labour 
practices in relation to which developed countries are thought to perform well and on which at 
least some of the major exporting developing countries are thought to perform poorly”.80  
 
On the one hand, the 1998 Declaration can be seen as a form of construction of market 
flexibility. For just as national governments can be complicit in such construction, as Polanyi had 
noted in his ‘Speenhamland’ example, so too can international organizations.81 On the other 
 
76 See Bob Hepple, ‘New Approaches to International Labour Regulation’ (1997) 26 ILJ 353 at 358.  
77 Langille (n 57), 431.  
78 See for discussion, Steve Charnovitz, ‘Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent 
Developments: The OECD Study and Developments in the Trade and Labour Standards Debate’ (1997) 11 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 131.   
79 Philip Alston, ‘“Core Labour Standards” and the Transformation of the International Labour Rights Regime’ 
(2004) 15 EJIL 457; Philip Alston, ‘Facing Up to the Complexities of the ILO’s Core Labour Standards Agenda’ 
(2005) 16 EJIL 457; Philip Alston and James Heenan, ‘Shrinking the International Labour Code’ (2004) 36(2/3) 
International Law and Politics 221; Standing (n 53), 367-8. See also Jill Murray, Taking Social Rights Seriously: Is 
there a Case for Institutional Reform of the ILO?’ in Colin Fenwick and Tonia Novitz (eds.), Human Rights at 
Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
80 Alston, ‘Core Labour Standards’ (n 79), 466 and 487. 





hand, the 1998 Declaration can be viewed as establishing a basis for social standard-setting in 
trade. Notably, ILO core labour standards were then utilised by the European Union (EU) in 
construction of its trade conditionality in the EU Generalised System of Preferences and labour 
(and sustainability) chapters in trade agreements,82 although this was done by reference to actual 
ILO Conventions. In this way, it can also be argued that the 1998 Declaration became part of “a 
network of measures and policies… integrated into powerful institutions”, designed to resist 
untrammeled market forces,83 or in another words a Polanyian countermovement in an era of 
globalization when capitalism was otherwise dominant. 
 
3.4 Recognition of a ‘Decent Work Agenda’ in ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization 2008 
 
The next incoming ILO Director-General, Juan Somavia, sought to pursue a broader ‘decent 
work agenda’. This agenda was so broad that Francis Maupain viewed ‘decent work’ as “a kind 
of normative potluck” from which everyone can bring anything to the table and take away 
whatever they want.84 Standing considered that too much was spent on the slogan ‘decent work’ 
and that Somavia’s “personalised commitment … marked a costly diversion from the need to 
forge a renewed role for the ILO in responding to the changing world of work in the twenty-first 
century …”.85 However, the Declaration might also be viewed as an attempt to engage in that 
process of renewal, even if it was not wholly successful.  
 
 
82 See on GSP Council Regulation 978/2012; and chapter 22 of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic Trade 
Agreement (CETA), provisionally applied from 2016 (regarding which see COM(2016) 443 final and 444 final and 
COM(2016)470 final). Discussed in Tonia Novitz, ‘Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between 
“Human Rights” and “Sustainable Development”? in Henner Gött (ed.), Labour Standards in International 
Economic Law (Springer, 2018). 
83 See text accompanying n 24 above. 
84 Francis Maupain, The Future of the International Labour Organization in the Global Economy (Hart, 2013), 54. 





Following the Report of a World Commission on the Social Dimension on Globalization in 
2004,86 the ILC adopted the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization 2008. The 
2008 Declaration left ‘decent work’ out of its title, seemingly resisting the constitutionalisation 
of the term, but the return to an emphasis on “social justice’’ was not unwelcome.87 This was an 
explicit response by the ILO to the effects of global trade. Article IA set out what was to be 
understood as the ‘decent work agenda’ consisting of “four equally important strategic 
objectives”: 
(i) promoting employment … 
(ii) developing and enhancing measures of social protection – social 
security and labour protection –which are sustainable and adapted to 
national circumstances… 
(iii) promoting social dialogue and tripartism… 
(iv) respecting, promoting and realizing the fundamental principles and 
rights at work, which are of particular significance, as both rights 
and enabling conditions that are necessary for the full realization of 
all the strategic objectives… 
 
There are certainly various facets of the ‘decent work agenda’ that are unclear from this text, 
such as how tripartism and social dialogue protected in para. (iii) can be distinguished from 
‘freedom of association and the effective right to collective bargaining’ in para (iv). Surely one 
depends on the other and they should be seen as mutually reinforcing rather than distinct? Also, 
the focus of enforcement in this context was not to be the constituent member states, or the 
employers which as commercial entities in the context of globalisation were causing havoc, but 
instead the gaze was to be pointed inward to the ILO to reform its procedures (Article II: 
“review” and adaptation of institutional practices).  
 
 
86 ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization, Creating Opportunities 
for All (ILO, 2004) Report issued 24 February 2004 (online report, 8 August 2019) 
<https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/ilo-bookstore/order-online/books/WCMS_PUBL_9221154262_EN/lang--
it/index.htm>.  





This seems to have been a prompt for the employers’ group to challenge ILO supervisory 
systems, such as the findings of ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR) through the 2012 walkout of the tripartite Conference 
Committee on the Applications of Standards (CAS).88 Others have observed that, despite the 
formal accommodation now reached on recognition of the right to strike by the ILO in 2015, the 
employers’ group has an upper hand in the process of the ‘Standards Review Mechanism’ put in 
place by the 2008 Declaration.89 There have been long standing concerns within the ILO that its 
internal practices regarding standard setting and supervision are flawed for a variety of reasons;90 
but the Office’s startling use of casualized staff contracts91 does not however seem currently up 
for review under this process. While reform might be needed, there is an outstanding question as 
to whether review can be achieved in ways that revitalize the International Labour Office and its 
activities, or whether the mechanism will be used opportunistically by the employer’s group and 
some disgruntled states, ranging from the US Trump and Brazil Bolsonaro administrations to 
outliers in the Global South, which wish to promote unimpeded market forces in the hire of 
labour. 
 
The other feature of the 2008 Declaration was the ambition stated in Article II(C) of policy 
coherence and cooperation with “[o]ther international and regional organizations with mandates 
in closely related fields” so as to attain “an integrated approach” to decent work in Article II(C). 
 
88 On the legitimacy of supervision of a right to strike under ILO Convention No 87. See Report of the CCAS, ILC 
Record of Proceedings (2012), 19/Part I/13-19; also Lee Swepston, ‘Crisis in the ILO Supervisory System: Dispute 
over the Right to Strike’ (2013) 29(2) The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 199; Claire La Hovary, ‘Employers’ Group 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike’ (2013) 42(4) ILJ 338; 
Janice Bellace, ’The ILO and the Right to Strike’ (2014) International Labour Review 29.  
89 Claire La Hovary, ‘The ILO’s Employers’ Group and the Right to Strike‘ (2016) 22(3) Transfer: European 
Review of Labour and Research 401, 404; Paul van der Heijden, ‘The ILO Stumbling towards Its Centenary 
Anniversary‘ (2018) 15(1) International Organizations Law Review 203, 219; Francis Maupain, ‘A Second Century 
for What?: The ILO at a Regulatory Crossroad‘ (2019) International Organizations Law Review, forthcoming (Web 
Page, 3 May 2019) <https://brill.com/view/journals/iolr/aop/article-10.1163-15723747-2019009.xml>, at 26. 
90 Dating from the classic advocacy by Sean Cooney, ‘Testing Time for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New 
International Political Economy’ (1999) 20 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 365. 





This provision stated that: “As trade and financial market policy both affect employment, it is the 
ILO’s role to evaluate those employment effects to achieve its aim of placing employment at the 
heart of economic policies.” This offered something of a partial return to the aspirations of 
Article III(e) of the Declaration of Philadelphia and the desire for ‘re-embedding’.  
 
However, little reference was made to the 2008 Declaration in the wake of the global financial 
crisis, when the IMF and EU institutions in some cases demanded and in others entreated 
austerity measures designed to make labour markets more flexible. This entailed direct reform of 
national collective bargaining systems,92 but also exclusion of those not deemed ‘employees’ or 
‘workers’ from the coverage of national labour law and social security.93 Such reforms 
constituted a significant challenge to the forms of social protection promoted in the past by the 
ILO which had been understood (at least in the Global North)94 as fundamental to ‘embedded 
liberalism’. 95 It was not only states that were complicit in this process, for employers also 
pursued new form of hiring to evade legal constraints, utilising online platforms and hiring 
through ‘apps’, in what has become known as the ‘gig economy’.96 Over the past decade, 
migrant labour has also been commodified further in its movement through what have been 
 
92 Stefan Clauwaert and Isabelle Schömann, The Crisis and National Labour Law Reforms:  A mapping exercise 
ETUI Working Paper 2012.04; and Aristea Koukiadaki, Isabel Tavora, Isabel and Miguel Martinez Lucio, The 
Transformation of Joint Regulation and Labour Market Policy in Europe during the Crisis: Comparative Project 
Report (University of Manchester/The European Commission 2014). 
93 Tonia Novitz, 'Changes in Employment Status under austerity and Beyond – Implications for freedom of 
association' (2016) 39(1) Dublin University Law Journal 27. 
94 Ronaldo Munck, ‘The Precariat: A view from the South’ (2013) 34(5) Third World Quarterly 747; see also 
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95 Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury, 2011); David Weil, The Fissured 
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Rodgers, Labour Law, Vulnerability and the Regulation of Precarious Work (Edward Elgar, 2016);  Leah Vosko, 
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described as “human supply chains”,97 compounded by increasing restrictions on lawful 
immigration and employment status.98 The ILO responded to the financial crisis by creating a 
‘Global Jobs Pact’ aimed at preserving employment in the short term and enhancing labour 
standards and social protection in the longer term.99 Its application seems to have been partial 
and its impact limited.100 
 
The creation of increasingly precarious work had the effect also of indirectly removing access to 
voice through trade unions. A “representation gap”101 between those who wish to be represented 
by a trade union and those who can be has widened, despite concerted efforts by trade unions to 
recruit workers hired under so-called ‘atypical’ work contracts. In the UK an attempt to utilise 
statutory channels for trade union recognition was treated as illegitimate, on the basis that 
substitution clauses in the contracts of ‘gig’ workers meant they did not comply with the 
legislative definition of ‘workers’ for such purposes.102  Notably, key sites of resistance have 
been the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and CEACR, which have found that 
freedom of association rights, including the right to effective collective bargaining and the right 
to strike, are rights of every one and not to be demarcated by employment status.103 This makes 
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sense, for the very tripartite constitutional structure of the ILO comes under threat if the worker 
delegates are not representative of those hired under precarious terms in new forms of work.  
 
4. Sustainability and Fictitious Commodities: Decent Work and Voice 
 
An interesting question is how the ILO can link its social justice mission to another emerging 
countermovement in the international sphere, namely that concerned with ‘sustainability’, which 
also stresses the importance of access to voice. The notion of ‘sustainability’ (of which 
‘sustainable development’ may be understood as a subset) emerged in the 1970s.104 Ostensibly 
an idea designed to promote longer term environmental protections, ‘sustainability’ has also been 
understood to encompass two other ‘pillars’, economic and social.105 There is an interesting 
parallel here with Polanyi’s observation that land (nature), labour (including social welfare 
which affects its availability) and money are fictitious commodities. They cannot be traded on 
markets merely as if they were any other kind of saleable item, since their value (or its lack) can 
have stark social effects, which is a reason for regulation. Using a Polanyian analysis, we can see 
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In Agenda 2030 adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015, which like Polanyi’s 
foundational text also refers to ‘transformation’,106 it was declared that these environmental, 
economic and social facets of sustainability have to be viewed holistically as interdependent.107 
Just as the sustainability pillars are understood as interconnected, so too it has been asserted that 
Polanyi’s “fictitious commodities are not separated from each other but closely interlinked”, for 
example in the context of contemporary supply chains which are a notable feature of global 
capitalism and exploitation of labour.108 
 
Sustainability has an appeal because it is an ambition designed to meet “the needs” of present 
and future generations and hence stresses the importance of durable environmental, economic 
and social policies.109 Some environmentalists have been concerned by the emphasis in a 
sustainability discourse on the Anthropocene, as opposed to the preservation of plant and animal 
life on the planet.110 Others have resisted the prominence of protection of economic ‘growth’ and 
a ‘green economy’ in the name of ‘sustainability’ in ways that serve capitalist dominance.111 
However, the synonym of ‘sustainability’ is ‘durability’, which at least confronts the so-called 
‘logic’ of short term capitalism.112 In particular, critical environmentalists from a post-
development perspective point to the need for both attention to expert scientific advice but also 
broader sources of knowledge, requiring radical social engagement with the pluriverse in policy-
 
106 United Nations (UN) (2015) General Assembly (GA) Resolution Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable  Development, 25 September 2015  A/Res/70/1 available at 
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making.113 They seek to build on the acknowledgement in the Aarhus Convention to build wider 
inclusion, representativity, transparency and participation; thereby embedding sustainability 
policies in society.114 
 
In the sense of offering “a network of measures and policies… integrated into powerful 
institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to land, labor and money”,115  the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognized in Agenda 2030116 may be regarded as a 
potential countermovement to the pursuit of ever more flexible global markets. While the 
enforcement mechanisms for their implementation rely on softer ‘orchestration’ than harder 
supervisory forms of enforcement under international law,117 they have multi-level (or 
polycentric) influence through the national plans envisaged in the 2008 ILO Declaration, 
regionally (for example, in an EU context),118 and have engaged attention from all UN agencies, 
including the ILO.  
 
The ILO has played its role by being instrumental in promoting “green jobs”119 and “just 
transitions”. The latter has been of particular significance, responding to ecological objectives 
but simultaneously managing redundancies and transfers of undertakings in responsible ways, 
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leading to the adoption of 2015 Guidelines.120 The ILO also successfully lobbied for an addition 
to the first of the Millennium Development Goals in 2007, so as to include a target which 
emphasized the significance of access to jobs for alleviation of poverty, a crucial socio-economic 
aspect of sustainable development.121  
 
Agenda 2030 goes even further by acknowledging more specifically “decent work” under SDG 
8, which also seeks to promote “economic growth”. This is obviously not entirely ideal, since the 
two are not always readily reconcilable, but SDG 8 and its associated targets and indicators do 
for the first time place labour standards squarely within a sustainability frame. Moreover, the 
term ‘decent work’ seems to be deliberately used in deference to ILO expertise. There is a 
commitment in paragraph 67 of the UN Resolution to protect “the labour standards of the 
International Labour Organization”, and there is specific reference to the ILO “Global Jobs Pact” 
in target 8.b.122 Certain core labour standards, particularly non-discrimination (specifically 
highlighting disability and equal pay in 8.5) and prevention of child labour and forced labour 
(target 8.7) are identified as a vital aspect of sustainable development. SDG 8 also goes further in 
the promotion of job creation (target 8.3), with a focus on youth employment (targets 8.5, 8.6 
and 8.b), and highlights the plight of  “those in precarious employment” (target 8.8). This highly 
inclusive idea of protection suggests there may be scope for the ILO to do more to protect those 
outside the standard employment relationship, hired in what are ironically increasingly common 
‘atypical’ forms of work.  
 
Notably omitted from the SDG 8 targets are freedom of association and the effective right to 
collective bargaining (perhaps due to the strength of the employer lobby also within the UN).123 
 
120 ILO Guidelines for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies (2015) (Web 
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These entitlements, usually recognized in an ILO context as one of four core labour standards, 
only serve as an indicator of protection of those involved in the most precarious forms of work 
(under SDG target 8.8 as indicator 8.8.2). The right to strike is, perhaps unsurprisingly, not 
mentioned at all. However, SDG 16 arguably provides some scope for bolstering trade union 
engagement in sustainability discourse. This may be done firstly, through trade union 
representation within an international institution like the ILO, as target 16.6 which seeks to 
“develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels”. Trade unions may also 
have scope to participate in vital social policy debates regarding the manifestation of 
sustainability under target 16.7 which aspires to “responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision-making”. Additionally, target 16.10 which refers to protection of 
“fundamental freedoms”, must be taken to incorporate freedom of association, including trade 
union rights.124  Maupain suggests that SDG 16 could usefully be imbued with more normative 
content and might draw on ILO experience and standards for this purpose.125  
 
Moreover, SDG 8 and SDG 16 have to be read in tandem with other SDGs which have a bearing 
on welfare in the world of work, such as those seeking to “end poverty” (SDG 1), “ensure 
healthy lives” (SDG 3), “promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” (SDG 4), “achieve 
gender equality and empower all women and girls” (SDG 5), and “reduce inequality within and 
among countries” (SDG 10). SDG 17 refers to the need to reform regulation of international 
finance and trade to create policy coherence in the form of a “Global Partnership for 
Development”.  
 
5. The ‘Future of Work’ Reports and Future Countermovement at the ILO 
 
 
Sector and the SDGs: The need to move beyond ‘business as usual’ (2016) 24(6) Sustainable Development 371. For 
concern expressed in this regard, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association, 7 August 2018, A/73/279, para. 6 and paras 87- 89. 
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The final part of this article considers the flurry of activity generated by conceptions of ‘the 
future of work’ generated in 2019 by the ILO, the OECD and the World Bank Group. There is a 
shared notion that this is, as is said in Article 1 of the ILO Centenary Declaration, “a time of 
transformative change in the world of work, driven by technological innovations, demographic 
shifts, environmental and climate change, and globalization…” In the 2019 Declaration, the ILO 
Global Commission Report, and indeed in the OECD and World Bank reports, the role of human 
agency in these developments (and the actors which have been responsible for many of them) 
have been neglected.126 However, the ILO Report differs from the other international institutions 
by arguing for a “social contract” with the explicit (and repeated) reference point of “social 
justice”,127 offering some significant resistance to the dominance of global market systems. 
 
The ILO Future of Work Initiative was launched as a centenary celebration by Director-General 
Guy Ryder.128 A Global Commission was appointed with a notable breadth of membership, 
including members from government, worker and employer backgrounds (as is typical in ILO 
tripartism), but also academics, representatives of NGOs (including an organization of self-
employed women) and the UN Secretary General’s Envoy on Youth.129 That diverse 
membership arguably prompted collaboration addressing problems beyond the mainstay of ILO 
preoccupations, but was likely to limit agreement to a few key issues on which there was genuine 
overlapping consensus. The Commission’s mission was supported by research outlined in two 
 
126 World Bank (n 13), at 19: “technology is disrupting the demand for skills…. technology has the potential to 
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127 ILO (n 10), at 10 - 14, 21 – 23, 38 and 54 – 56.  
128 See Report of the Director General: ILO Future of Work Centenary Initiative, ILC 104th Session (ILO, Geneva, 
2015), at 11, para. 47 (Web Page, 6 May 2019): https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
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International Labour Office Reports: an Inception Report for the Global Commission on the 
Future of Work130 and a Synthesis Report of the National Dialogues on the Future of Work.131  
 
Attention was paid in the Global Commission Report to environmental needs,132 technology, the 
informal economy and the phenomenon of women’s unpaid work,133 with key pronouncements 
on lifelong learning, social security and a “Universal Labour Guarantee”.134 Lifelong learning is 
to be for all and support people through transitions. It was recommended that social protection be 
universal (extended “to workers in all forms of work, including self-employment”) and available 
from birth to old age, “complemented by contributory social insurance schemes that provide 
increased levels of protection”.135 Notably, the focus of the Global Commission was on 
“increasing investment in people’s capabilities”, but in this respect is less reminiscent of 
Langille’s narrow approach based on individual functionings, reflecting more that envisaged by 
Deakin and Wilkinson who have signalled the importance of both resources and procedural 
means such as collective bargaining and corporate governance.136 The Global Commission 
Report further emphasised  a human-centred approach, focussing on access to voice as a facet of 
‘social justice’.137 The Report repeated three times that “labour is not a commodity”,138 referring 
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Appreciating the diversity and likely further transformation of working lives, the Global 
Commission’s arguably most radical proposal was a new “Universal Labour Guarantee” to apply 
to everyone engaged in work, which would have two aspects. One is (as would be expected) 
universal protection of the core labour standards instantiated by the 1998 ILO Declaration, 
namely “fundamental workers’ rights: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining and freedom from forced labour, child labour and 
discrimination”.140  The second more controversial aspect is universal entitlement to “a set of 
basic working conditions: (i) ‘adequate living wage’, (ii) limits on hours of work and (iii) safe 
and healthy workplaces”.141 This proposal was manifested in Article III(B) of the 2019 
Declaration which stated that: 
All workers should enjoy adequate protection in accordance with the Decent Work 
Agenda, taking into account:  
(i) Respect for their fundamental rights; 
(ii) An adequate minimum wage, statutory or negotiated; 
(iii) Maximum limits on working time; 
(iv) Safety and health at work. 
 
This Guarantee could offer protection of both personal autonomy and material needs. It was said 
by the Global Commission to be aimed at “renewing the democratic underpinnings of our labour 
markets, and strengthening social dialogue, giving everybody a voice in shaping the changes 
underway and the quality of their working lives”.142 That Report was not, however, fulsome on 
how worker ‘voice’ is to be provided, 143 chiming with the scant acknowledgement in 2015 
Director-General’s Report of controversy over the right to strike.144  
 
This limitation was, however, at least partially overcome by the terms of the Centenary 
Declaration and the 2019 Office SDG 8 Report for the High Level Political Forum, which made 
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important statements of intent regarding the status of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.145 Article II(A)(vi) of the 2019 Declaration, for example, stressed that ILO must 
“direct its efforts” to “ promoting workers’ rights as a key element for the attainment of inclusive 
and sustainable growth [using the wording of SDG 8] with a focus on freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining as enabling rights”; while Article 
IIB made clear that “social dialogue” includes “collective bargaining and tripartite cooperation” 
which is to “provide an essential foundation of all ILO action and contributes to successful 
policy and decision-making in its member states”. In Article III(A), inter alia, stress was placed 
on “effective lifelong learning and quality education for all” and “universal access to 
comprehensive and sustainable social protection” as well as “effective measures to support 
people through the transitions they will face throughout their working lives”. Article IV(C) 
envisaged that the ILO would “strengthen the capacity of its tripartite constituents to … 
encourage the development of strong and representative social partner organizations” and 
provide “strong, influential and inclusive mechanisms of social dialogue”. Article IV(F) 
acknowledged the need for action on “policy coherence” by the ILO, which “on the basis of its 
constitutional mandate must take an important role in the multilateral system”. The International 
Labour Office, determined not merely to be a “popular gladfly”,146 in Time to Act for SDG 8, 
utilized the ‘transformative’ language of Polanyi.147 The Office both appreciated the overlap of 
SDG 8 with other SDGs,148 and stressed that social dialogue and collective bargaining are vital to 
achievement not only of SDG 8 but Agenda 2030 as a whole, envisaging an expansion in trade 
union membership and representation.149 The Office Report was, however, again weak on the 
details of how this is to be achieved. 
 
If a countermovement based on universal worker voice is to be made manifest, the ILO may 
have to re-engage with standard setting and supervision relating to collective voice and action. 
Indeed, the ILO constitutionally needs such reform to establish the representative legitimacy of 
 
145 See ILO (n 11). 
146 See Standing (n 53). 
147 ILO (n 11), 2 and 28 – 30.  
148 Ibid., for e.g. at 2 and figures at 29 and 32.  





its own internal governance (and thereby its survival) as well as social justice within constituent 
member states. Here lies scope for rebalancing the market and the social in Polanyian terms, 
which is not achieved by developments at the ILO in 2019 but could be built on their 
foundations. 
 
These ILO recommendations differed from those issued in 2019 by the World Bank and the 
OECD. The World Bank Report, The Changing Nature of Work, was the culmination of a long 
and troubling drafting process. In the spring of 2018, a Civil Society Policy Forum taking place 
alongside the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings in Bali had expressed concerns regarding 
the deregulatory tenor of the draft report, as did the International Trade Union Confederation and 
the ILO.150 The result was a public letter asking for the draft report’s amendment.151 The ILO 
followed up with further written comments and a meeting in Geneva.152  
 
The final World Bank Report published in 2019 was less overtly concerned with deregulation of 
labour markets. Indeed, it superficially shared some of the same concerns and language as the 
ILO Global Commission. For example, the World Bank Report also recommended supporting 
education, using the term “life-long learning” alongside “human capital”.153 This reflects the 
introduction by the Bank in 2018 of a ‘Human Capital project’,154 which articulates ways in 
which investment in health care and education can aid human productivity and sets up a matrix 
for its measurement.   The Bank also advocated improvements in social security to manage 
transitions caused by changes in technology,155 endorsing a Universal Basic Income (UBI) paid 
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for by state taxation; but taking the view that contribution-based social security (drawing on 
employer contributions) is impossible in the context of the growth in non-standard employment 
relationships. Only the most minimal version of social security, with sizeable cuts to employer 
contributions, was found to be viable.156     
 
The International Labour Office has observed that the Bank’s new Human Capital Index157 is 
problematic because it failures to address achievement of individual capability as an ongoing 
rather than finite endeavour.158 Further, the Office doubts that the UBI could fulfil a “social 
minimum” and considers that reduced contributions along the lines of the “minimum social 
insurance” envisaged by the Bank “would result in hardship and increased poverty, especially for 
low wage earners”.159 Here, one is arguably reminded of Polanyi’s concern with the 
Speenhamland system.160 A system which seems to protect “the right to live”, but simultaneously 
deprives people of control over their labour, agency and voice, should (from past experience) be 
suspect. While the World Bank, like the ILO, uses the term “social contract”;161 this is of a very 
different species to that advocated by the 2019 ILO Report; for example, trade unions and 
collective bargaining are mentioned only once in the World Bank Report and in the context of 
their decline;162 and the World Bank Report mentions “sustainable economic growth”,163 but not 
the SDGs or Agenda 2030. To this extent, the Bank continues contemplating labour as a 
commodity (or “human capital”), instrumental to the achievement of productivity goals.  
 
The World Bank idea of “human capital” can be compared and contrasted with the approach 
taken in a much earlier ILO Convention No. 142 on Human Resources Development which 
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refers in Article 1(3) to the “ability of the individual to understand and, individually or 
collectively, to influence the working and social environment” and in Article 1(4) to encouraging 
and enabling all persons without discrimination “to develop and use their capabilities for work in 
their own best interests and in accordance with their own aspirations, account being taken of the 
needs of society”. Productivity is not mentioned as an aspiration in the ILO Convention, but 
individual and collective autonomy are, in a way which chimes with Polanyi’s prescriptions for 
effective regulation.164 
 
The OECD Employment Outlook 2019 (titled The Future of Work) is an even more lengthy and 
technical report when compared to the ILO and Bank offerings (running to 345 pages). 
Summarising every aspect of its content is therefore not possible in this context. Its chief concern 
was to address changes to the labour market and their regulation, focussing on the need to 
narrowly define non-standard work, but also extend certain rights and protections to such 
workers.165 The OECD Report addressed and advocated adult learning,166 departing from the 
World Bank’s more critical approach.167 The OECD also has recommended modifying social 
protection systems to aid labour market transitions.168 In respect of the latter, the OECD 
considered a range of options with a degree of technical sophistication pointing out pros and 
cons, being less prescriptive than the Bank. However, notably the concern of the OECD was 
repeatedly with “fiscal sustainability” of social security systems rather than sustainable 
development per se.169  
 
The OECD Report did contain a chapter relating to collective bargaining; another stark contrast 
to the World Bank Report.170 However, its concerns were not so much with providing the 
universal access to collective bargaining which the ILO Universal Labour Guarantee 
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contemplates, but giving marginal workers (“in the grey zone”) rights to collective bargaining.171 
Further the OECD seemed to advocate using collective bargaining as a way of gaining greater 
flexibility, so that approval to derogate from statutory labour standards could be encouraged.172 
Unsurprisingly, the Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD was concerned, and in its 
response stressed the importance of collective and individual safeguards against deviation from 
statutory standards and the importance of sectoral bargaining as a way of improving labour 
market regulation.173  When compared to the OECD Report, it is again evident that the 2019 ILO 
Report offers much more from the perspective of re-embedding the market in the social sphere; 
resisting the commodification of labour by seeking to revitalise the voice of everyone, regardless 




This article has investigated how a Polanyian narrative may be relevant to an understanding of 
ILO activities and its processes of reinvention and reform. It has outlined the fundamental tenets 
of Polanyi’s overarching analysis and sought to explain their relevance to past and future work at 
the ILO. A broad understanding of Polanyi’s idea of countermovement is vital for this purpose, 
for it helps us to understand the ways in which, at various junctures, ILO Declarations have 
sought to re-embed a dominant global market economy in the social realities of those affected, 
especially workers, with reference to the idea of ‘social justice’. This article has also identified 
ways in which contemporary sustainability discourse seems to mirror Polanyi’s concerns with 
the fictitious commodities of land, labour and money. Indeed, the SDGs might constitute a 
broader global countermovement to which the ILO could meaningfully contribute. Finally, 
considering recent reports on the future of work from a variety of international institutions, it 
emerges that the ILO has retained its own distinctive message regarding the importance of a 
social justice approach which enables wide-ranging labour protections and access to voice. The 
ILO continues to offer a corrective to the aspirations of more market-driven objectives evident in 
 
171 Ibid. 
172  Ibid. 






the positions taken by other international institutions regarding future dynamics and regulation of 
labour markets.  
 
That said, the acceleration in the use of constitutional declaratory instruments within the ILO as a 
means of resistance, to instantiate repeated countermovements as a response to the globalization 
and commercialization of labour markets, is also indicative of a larger failure in international 
economic governance. There is a notable division between the political communications of the 
ILO grounded in tripartism (even if its representative quality is becoming questionable) and the 
economic system based on productivity and profit objectives. Polanyi saw such 
countermovements as an inevitable response to the disembedding of market structures from 
societal concerns, but their reactive quality also made them sometimes inappropriate and 
unpredictable. He cited fascism;174 today we might think of other authoritarian and populist 
regimes, whether in Brazil and the US (as noted above) or indeed Hungary, Italy and Turkey.175 
Trump’s trade wars with China176 and the threats against Mexico177 are also arguably reminiscent 
of “the disintegration of the world economy” and “failure of the international system” that 
caused such hardship and triggered catastrophic effects in the 1930s.178  
 
Polanyi advocated that a ‘complex society’ (and here he was predominantly talking about the 
nation state, but we might recognize our society as global) required ongoing responsible 
regulation to promote human freedom. This could ultimately be achieved by inclusive voice 
within sustainable participatory representative systems. This is what the ILO must now seek to 
embed, in even more proactive ways than is evident in the 2019 Reports and Declaration.   
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